Extraction / Mining Mapping
In March 2026, Ghana implemented a sliding-scale royalty regime for gold mining, replacing the previous fixed rate with a structure ranging from 5% to 12%, indexed to the gold price. Newmont’s stability agreement at its Ahafo complex, Africa’s largest gold operation at 798,000 ounces in 2024, expired in December 2025 without renewal eligibility under the new framework. The $950 million Ahafo North expansion now faces immediate exposure to revised fiscal terms. AngloGold Ashanti and Gold Fields retain stability agreements expiring in 2027, after which they transition to the universal regime. In April 2025, the Ghanaian government seized control of Gold Fields’ Damang mine after rejecting a lease renewal, issuing a 12-month transitional lease that expired in April 2026. Three domestic operators submitted bids to acquire the asset. At the same time, Ghana fell seven places in the Global Mining Investment Attractiveness Index, from 46th in 2024 to 53rd in 2025, ranking behind Ivory Coast, the DRC, Namibia, Zambia, Tanzania, Morocco and Botswana.
In the same period, Ivory Coast was building the most active gold development pipeline in West Africa. Montage Gold’s Kone project, targeting first gold in late Q4 2026 with over $545 million committed and a 300,000-ounce annual production profile, is entering construction execution. Endeavour Mining’s Lafigue, commissioned in August 2024, is delivering 180,000 to 210,000 ounces annually. Aurum Resources increased its Boundiali mineral resource by 50% to 3.03 million ounces, with Perseus Mining taking a 9.9% stake. Endeavour is advancing Tanda-Iguela as a potential third flagship. The government’s stated target is to reach production levels comparable to Ghana by 2030, with Minister of Mines Mamadou Coulibaly indicating output should exceed 100 tonnes in the near future.
The two countries are moving in opposite directions on a dimension that mining capital prices heavily: fiscal predictability.
Ghana’s royalty reform has a stated logic. At gold prices above $4,000 per ounce, the previous fixed royalty rate captured a smaller share of windfall revenue than the government judged appropriate. The sliding scale is designed to increase state revenue during commodity booms while maintaining lower rates during downturns. The Ghana Chamber of Mines has pushed back, arguing the change could deter investment at a time when elevated prices are already increasing royalty payments by over $100 per ounce. The concern is not the rate itself but the signal: a government that changes fiscal terms during a price cycle introduces uncertainty about what terms will apply during the next cycle. Stability agreements, which were the mechanism for providing fiscal certainty, are being allowed to expire without replacement. For a company evaluating whether to commit $500 million to a new mine in Ghana, the question is what the fiscal regime will look like in 2032, not 2026.
Ivory Coast has taken a different path, but not an entirely frictionless one. In January 2025, the government introduced a flat 8% mining royalty, backdated to the start of the year. The change was applied without prior negotiation, overriding contractual protections. Perseus Mining, which operates Sissingue and Yaoure, absorbed the increase while maintaining an EBITDA margin of 59.3%, well above the ASX gold peer median of 42.7%. The distinction is that Ivory Coast raised the rate but kept it flat and predictable, while Ghana introduced a variable rate indexed to a volatile input. For operators, a known 8% is easier to model than a 5-to-12% range that fluctuates with the gold price. The Ivorian approach imposes a higher baseline cost but offers greater certainty about what that cost will be over the life of a mine.
The regulatory environment extends beyond royalty rates. Ghana’s government has signalled an appetite for resource nationalism that goes beyond fiscal adjustment. The Damang seizure, the non-renewal of stability agreements, and the expansion of local content requirements from 19 to 51 reserved items have collectively generated unease in the international investment community. Ghana’s score on mineral potential in the attractiveness index also declined, reflecting insufficient geological investigation, which is the foundation of the sector’s long-term pipeline. Ivory Coast, by contrast, has invested in streamlining its permitting process, strengthening its mining code, and building infrastructure that serves the mining corridor. The regulatory signal is differentiation: serious developers with defined resources and advancing projects face a predictable path to production.
The capital flow data supports what the index rankings indicate. Exploration spending in Ivory Coast has increased materially over the past three years. Montage Gold’s $545 million-plus commitment at Kone, Perseus’s A$23.69 million investment in Aurum at Boundiali, and Endeavour’s $415 million at Lafigue represent capital decisions made on the basis of Ivorian fiscal and regulatory conditions. In Ghana, capital is still flowing, but the composition is shifting: Newmont’s Ahafo North is proceeding but under revised fiscal exposure, while the broader exploration pipeline faces uncertainty about what terms will govern future discoveries. The question is not whether Ghana still attracts capital. It does. The question is whether, on the margin, the next dollar of exploration and development capital in West Africa is more likely to go to Ivory Coast, where the fiscal regime is higher but predictable, or to Ghana, where it is variable and accompanied by signals of expanding state intervention.
The geological dimension is not a secondary factor. Both countries sit on the Birimian greenstone belt. The geology does not respect national borders. A deposit of equivalent grade and tonnage on either side of the Ghana-Ivory Coast border faces different fiscal, regulatory and permitting conditions. For a junior explorer deciding where to stake claims, or a mid-tier developer deciding where to commit feasibility capital, the regulatory premium or discount attached to each jurisdiction directly affects project NPV. At current gold prices, both jurisdictions are economically viable. But investment decisions are made at the margin, and the margin is where policy divergence has its greatest effect.
The broader West African context amplifies the comparison. Mali’s provisional administration of Loulo-Gounkoto and 23% decline in industrial output represent the extreme end of resource nationalism risk. Burkina Faso’s mining code revision and Wahgnion nationalisation sit in the middle. Senegal’s audit and revocation of 71 licences under Sonko targets speculative holders while advancing serious projects like Diamba Sud. Guinea, under the Simandou 2040 framework, is building an investor-friendly environment anchored by the world’s largest undeveloped iron ore deposit. Each jurisdiction is making a different bet about the optimal balance between state revenue capture and investment attraction. The outcomes will be measurable over the next five years in exploration spending, new mine construction starts, and production trajectories.
For the regional gold map, the divergence between Ghana and Ivory Coast is the most consequential policy competition documented in this series. Ghana remains Africa’s largest gold producer, with output around 125 tonnes. Ivory Coast produced 58 tonnes in 2024 and is targeting 100 tonnes by 2030. The gap is large. But the direction of the pipeline tells a different story: Ivory Coast has more new large-scale gold projects at construction or advanced development stage than Ghana. If Kone, Boundiali, Tanda-Iguela and the next generation of discoveries deliver, the production gap could narrow significantly by the end of the decade. Ghana’s established mines (Ahafo, Obuasi, Tarkwa, Iduapriem) provide volume. Ivory Coast’s pipeline provides growth. Which trajectory prevails depends in large part on which regulatory environment the market prices as more favourable for the next cycle of investment.
The question is not which country has the better geology. Both do. The question is which country offers the more investable framework for converting that geology into production. In 2026, the data points are accumulating on Ivory Coast’s side. Ghana has an opportunity to reset the signal by clarifying the long-term fiscal framework and restoring investor confidence in regulatory stability. If it does, the competition becomes productive for both countries. If it does not, the repricing of regional investment attractiveness that is already underway will continue to redirect capital toward the jurisdictions that offer the most predictable path from discovery to production.