The Lobito Corridor is entering its construction phase. In late April 2026, the Africa Finance Corporation confirmed that nine international EPC contractors had completed site visits in Zambia, with bids expected in May. AFC is now in talks with at least ten African and foreign financiers, including Standard Bank, Absa, Ecobank and Citi, to raise between $3 and $5 billion. Financial close is targeted for Q4 2027, with groundbreaking on the new Zambian and Angolan sections planned for late 2026 or early 2027, and completion targeted for 2030. The total project cost stands at approximately $5 billion. This is not a concept anymore. It is a procurement process with contractors on site.
The corridor has three physical components. The first is the brownfield rehabilitation of the 1,300-kilometre Benguela Railway from the port of Lobito on Angola’s Atlantic coast to the DRC border at Luau. This section is already operational under a 30-year concession awarded in 2022 to Lobito Atlantic Railway, a consortium of Trafigura, Mota-Engil and Vecturis. In January 2026, AFC and Eaglestone acted as co-financial advisers on key financing agreements for this segment, including a $553 million loan from the US International Development Finance Corporation and $200 million from the Development Bank of Southern Africa. LAR has committed to investing $455 million in Angola and $100 million in the DRC on equipment, operations and infrastructure. The second component is the refurbishment of the DRC section from Dilolo to Kolwezi, currently operated by the national railway company SNCC under severely degraded conditions, with train speeds of 10 to 15 km/h and less than 5% of capacity in use. A further 315 kilometres of new track is planned in the DRC. The third is the greenfield construction of approximately 830 kilometres of new rail in Zambia, from Luacano on the Angolan border to Chingola in the Copperbelt, the largest new railway project in Zambia since the TAZARA line was built with Chinese financing in the 1970s.
The financing architecture reflects the geopolitical weight of the project. AFC has committed $500 million. The AfDB has pledged $200 million. Italy, through Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, is contributing approximately $320 million, structured under the Mattei Plan framework to create Italian supply chain opportunities in infrastructure and renewable energy components. The US DFC has provided a $553 million direct loan for the Angolan section. The EU is engaged through its Global Gateway initiative. AFC’s CEO has stated the project requires annual cargo commitments of 2.5 to 3 million tonnes to be commercially viable. Agreements are already signed for 1 million tonnes, with visibility to reach 5 million tonnes as Zambian and Congolese copper production scales.
The operational case is already being tested. In 2025, LAR transported over 200,000 tonnes of cargo to and from the port of Lobito. In Q1 2026, the first shipment of copper anodes from Kamoa-Kakula’s new smelter was transported via the Lobito Corridor to Lobito, then shipped to the Aurubis refinery in Europe. The commercial operation was handled by Trafigura. Transit time from the DRC Copperbelt to the Atlantic coast averaged seven days by rail, compared to more than three weeks by truck to Durban or Dar es Salaam. Ivanhoe Mines has signed a non-binding term sheet to transport 120,000 to 240,000 tonnes of copper products annually via the corridor. The route passes within five kilometres of the Kamoa-Kakula licence boundary and through the Western Forelands exploration licences. As the DRC’s copper output is forecast to grow to 3.4 million tonnes in 2026, the question of which corridor captures the marginal tonne is becoming a live commercial issue.
This is where the geopolitical dimension enters. The Lobito Corridor is positioned by the United States and the European Union as a counterweight to China’s expanding infrastructure presence in the region. China’s response has been direct. CCECC announced a $1.4 billion investment to rehabilitate the TAZARA Railway, the 1,860-kilometre line connecting Zambia’s Copperbelt to the port of Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean. The two corridors create an east-west axis across Southern Africa. One sends minerals to the Atlantic, the other to the Indian Ocean. For Zambia and the DRC, positioned at the centre of both systems, the competition generates leverage. Multiple upgraded routes mean more options, better terms and reduced dependency on any single export pathway.
The corridor is not, however, only a mineral logistics play. The EU has invested in complementary development along the Angolan section: a logistics platform at Caala linking Huambo’s agricultural producers to export routes, a $43 million TVET programme for skills development in transport, logistics and agriculture, and water supply investments across three provinces. The first shipment of avocados from Huambo to Europe via Lobito has already been made. The stated target is a 30% increase in the value of agricultural and mineral exports through the corridor by 2030. The question is whether this economic diversification materializes at scale or remains marginal beside the mineral volumes.
For Angola, the strategic calculus extends beyond transit fees. Luanda is positioning itself as a logistics hub rather than solely a resource exporter, a posture its diplomats describe as “corridor multilateralism.” The Lobito Corridor anchors Western and multilateral financing in a country that has traditionally relied on Chinese credit lines secured against oil production. Angola is also developing a Southern Corridor to transform the port of Namibe and the Mocamedes Railway into a second regional logistics hub. If both corridors advance, Angola could operate two Atlantic exit points for Central African minerals, a significant shift in the regional infrastructure map.
The structural question is whether the financing and construction timelines hold. AFC initially expected financial close in 2026, but the complexity of a multi-country, multi-lender, multi-segment project has pushed it to Q4 2027. The DRC section remains the weakest link physically, with SNCC’s infrastructure requiring heavy investment before it can integrate with the upgraded Angolan and new Zambian segments. And the commercial viability threshold of 2.5 to 3 million tonnes per year depends on production ramp-ups at mines that face their own operational challenges, Kamoa-Kakula included.
What is not in doubt is the direction. Over $6 billion in foreign direct investment has been pledged toward the Lobito Corridor, making it one of the fastest-growing focal points for infrastructure FDI on the continent. The corridor is restructuring the physical and commercial routes by which Central Africa’s copper and cobalt reach global markets. The question for the next 18 months is whether procurement converts into construction on schedule, whether the DRC bottleneck is addressed, and whether the commercial cargo commitments keep pace with the capital being deployed. The minerals are there. The financing is assembling. The infrastructure is the variable.